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EDWARD

I.

G.

MASCOLO·

INTRODUCTION

An impartial observer of the American criminal justice system
must be fascinated by the intense interplay between the strivings for
freedom and the demands of order. Certain truisms come readily to
mind: There can be no liberty without order; neither, however, can
there be permanent order without meaningful freedom for the individ
ual. Similarly, one is reminded that an enlightened and democratic
society, which casts its lot with the primacy of individual security and
integrity (in short, a society dedicated to the supremacy of the rule of
law under which the ultimate power rests with the people), demands
that government be the servant rather than the master of the people
and, in its dealings with individual members of society, that it act
fairly and within a code of civilized decency.
Tensions still exist. While decency and the spiritual nature of
man cannot long endure in a closed society controlled by the rule of
force, neither can freedom itself long endure in an atmosphere of fear
and anarchy, dominated by the rule of criminal violence. When a
* Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief of
the Connecticut Bar Journal, 1969-73; current member of the Connecticut Bar Journal
Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1952.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone.
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democratic "[s]ociety is at war with the criminal classes,") it has, in
effect, put itself on trial. It must confront the issue as to how far it is
prepared to defend cherished notions of fair play and a sense of justice
without simultaneously abdicating its responsibility of self-preserva
tion. This issue implicates the moral caliber of such a society, and will
help to define the standards of decency that will govern its relations
with its members.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that methods employed in the ad
ministration of the criminal law have generated (and inspired) intense
debate concerning the scope of permissible or acceptable behavior by
government in its efforts to combat the destabilizing influences of anti
social behavior within a system of justice commited to standards of
civilized conduct by government and its agents. In short, a free soci
ety about to do battle with its criminal elements must be prepared to
say how far it will permit its government to go in "fighting the good
fight" against crime. Will that society insist upon standards of con
duct that, while potentially offensive to "some fastidious squeamish
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically,"3 do not "shock[] the conscience,"4 or will it sanction
methods of law enforcement that make the government virtually indis
tinguishable from the criminal?
It is the thesis of this article that a society which tolerates crimi
nal behavior and methods by its government in combatting crime is a
society that has fatally blurred the fundamental distinction between
the rule of law and the lawless enforcement of the criminal law, and by
so doing, cannot long endure. S Specifically, this article will step be
yond the Supreme Court's suggestion 6 and will propose a due process 7
I. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion).
2. Cj Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,449 (1962)(the quality of a civiliza
tion may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement of its criminal
laws).
3. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
4. Id.
5. Cj McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943)("[a] democratic society, in
which respect for the dignity of all men is central, [must] guard[ ] against the misuse of the
law enforcement process," and must provide "safeguards . . . against the dangers of the
overzealous as well as the despotic").
6. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976)(Brennan, Stewart, &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting), and id. at 492-93, 494-95 & nn. 6-7 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the jUdgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-32 (1973)(dictum).
7. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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defense, supplemented by principles of judicial integrity and public
policy, against outrageous practices of government agents in the en
forcement of the criminal laws that shock the conscience and offend
civilized standards of conduct. 8 Further, this defense will be an abso
lute bar to the government invoking judicial processes to secure a con
viction of an individual against whom such methods have been
employed. It will require the courts to close their doors to "such pros
titution of the criminal law"9 so as "not to be made the instrument of
wrong." 10
This article will first review the related doctrine of entrapment
and analyze both the subjective and objective tests for its application.
It will demonstrate that the subjective test endorsed by a majority of
the Supreme Court, II with its analysis focused upon the criminal pre
disposition of an accused, is simply inadequate to protect the predis
posed defendant against outrageous police behavior. This article will
next explore the feasibility of a due process defense of outrageous gov
ernment conduct and find doctrinal support for such a defense in both
the objective test for entrapment and the equitable "clean hands" de
fense developed by Justice Brandeis in his memorable dissent in Olm
stead v. United States. 12 Finally, it will argue for the adoption of a due
process defense and will show not only that the need for such a defense
is critical for the predisposed defendant, but also that it must be recog
nized by the courts as a moral imperative to protect government from
the vices of its own agents and to preserve judicial integrity. In sum,
this article will advocate the existence of an intimate relationship be
tween the defense, on the one hand, and public policy and judicial
integrity, on the other hand.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT

The term "entrapment" signifies "instigation of crime by officers
8. This defense of due process, while related to entrapment, is independent of the
principles applicable to the latter doctrine. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see
also United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974).
9. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
10. Id. at 456.
II. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1976)(plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, Burger, & White, n.); id. at 492 n.2 (Powell & Blackmun, n., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973)(5-4 decision); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958)(5-4 decision on appropriate relation test to be
applied); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 448, 451-52 (1932)(5-3 decision on
issue of appropriate test).
12. 277 U.S. 438, 471, 483-85 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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of government." 13 It has been defined as "the conception and planning
of an offense by an officer [of the law], and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."14 Thus, entrapment "oc
curs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative
activity' of law-enforcement officials."15
Because entrapment implicates government and its agents in
criminal activity, it is a concept which lends itself to controversy l6 and
is appealing to defendants as a defense to criminal prosecution. The
"Abscam" cases l7 and the celebrated trial of John DeLorean are re
cent examples of the intense litigation generated by entrapment.
In addition, the Supreme Court has "sharply divided" over "the
meaning, purpose, and application of entrapment in criminal
cases. . . ."18 Much of this division has centered on whether the con
trolling standard for the defense of entrapment focuses on the conduct
of law enforcement officers (the objective test) or the predisposition of
the defendant to commit the offense of which he stands charged (the
sUbjective test).19
The subjective test for entrapment, espoused by a majority of the
Supreme Court,20 requires a two-pronged inquiry. First, a court must
determine whether the government agents induced the defendant to
commit the crime in question. If the court so finds, 2I it must then
13. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion).
14. Id. at 454; see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States
v. Taveiman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); State
v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 4, 89 A.2d 219, 221 (1952)("entrapment" constitutes the in
ducement, by government, of an individual to commit a criminal offense, not contemplated
by him, for the purpose of prosecution).
15. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)(emphasis in the origi
nal)(quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932».
16. See, e.g., 35 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2367, 2367-69 (Aug. 22, 1984).
17. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 264 (1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
524 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982)(Myers II), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2438 (1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 459 U.S.
835 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
18. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 596 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
19. Id.; see Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opin
ion); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 372-73, 376-78 (1958); id. at 382-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441-42,451 (1932); id. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., sepa
rate opinion); see also Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36.
20. See cases cited supra note 11.
21. The defendant carries the burden of persuasion on this issue, United States v.
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make a subjective inquiry into the defendant's predisposition to com
mit the offense. 22 This latter inquiry is crucial under the subjective
test. If a finding of predisposition is made?3 the defense will fail 24
regardless of the degree and kind of misconduct perpetrated by the
government agents. 25
Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983)(burden satisfied by defendant showing "that govern
ment initiated the crime"); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952), by
a fair perponderance of the evidence. United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799,801-03 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1064 (1972); see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 373
n.28 (1972)(it is generally required that the defendant has the burden of establishing the
facts constituting entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence). Although the subjec
tive analysis focuses on the defendant's propensity for crime, rather than on the conduct of
the police, both factors have been assessed in determining whether entrapment appears
from the evidence. See. e.g., United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 6\3, 615 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,451 (1932).
22. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976)(plurality opinion);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrells V. United States, 287 U.S.
435,451-52 (1932); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952); Note, Due
Process Defense when Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L.J. 1455,
1457 (1979).
23. Here, the government has the burden of proof, United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d
62, 67 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952),
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones, 575 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799,
801-03 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391
Mass. 345, 351, 462 N.E.2d 80, 84 (1984); see United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,597
(3d Cir.)(en banc)(the government must disprove the entrapment defense beyond a reason
able doubt), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see also Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d
370, 373 (1st Cir. 1967)(appearing to endorse standard for predisposition).
Once entrapment has been properly raised, it may be rebutted only by proof of actual
predisposition, and not by reasonable cause to suspect criminal involvement on the part of
the accused. The reasonable suspicion doctrine poses the threat of convicting an otherwise
innocent person who has been harassed into crime, thereby deflecting the Sorrells-endorsed
inquiry, see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932), into the culpability of the
defendant. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 197-98 (1976).
24. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1976)(plurality opinion);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973); United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886,
891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984);
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Peppars, 140 Cal. App.
3d 677, 685, 189 Cal. Rptr. 879, 884 (1st Dist. 1983); Note, supra note 22, at 1457; see
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants. Spies. Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60
YALE L.J. 1091, 1102 (1951).
25. See Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102. The First Circuit has rejected the bifur
cated analysis of inducement and predisposition as separate issues, and has adopted a more
comprehensive and singular approach involving an examination of the ultimate issue of
entrapment. See United States v. Annese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760,761 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Rodriguez [sic]
v. United States, 401 U.S. 943 (1971); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373-74 (1st
Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126, 127-28 (Ist Cir. 1982). Under the
First Circuit approach, as developed in Kadis, inducement is not treated as a separate issue.
The First Circuit argued, in Kadis, that consideration of inducement as a separate issue
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It is therefore apparent that under the sUbjective analysis, as de
veloped in Sorrells v. United States,26 and reaffirmed in Sherman v.
United States,27 entrapment arises when law enforcement officers in
duce or lure otherwise innocent persons to the commission of crime. 28
As so framed, the defense prohibits conviction for an offense "which is
the product of the creative activity of [government] officials."29 Thus,
for a court to determine whether entrapment has been established, it
must distinguish between the seduction of the innocent and the en
snarement of the guilty.30 Accordingly, since the genesis of the de
fense and the rationale of the subjective analysis are rooted in the
legislative intent underlying the particular statute alleged to have been
violated (namely, that it could not have been the intent of the legisla
ture to enforce the statute against "persons otherwise innocent" who
were induced by government agents to violating it),3) the focus of in
quiry will be on the character of the defendant and his predisposition
to commit the crime in question, and not on the offensive governmen
tal conduct. 32
tended to emphasize the need "to police the police" regardless of the degree of corruptibil
ity of the defendant. 373 F.2d at 373. Such an approach, implicitly argued the court,
would be out of step with the subjective analysis of entrapment espoused by a majority of
the Supreme Court. As the First Circuit noted, the subjective test does not distinguish
"between the issues of inducement and predisposition," nor does it condemn "the act of
inducement apart from its effect on an innocent man." Id. at 374 (footnote omit
ted)(emphasis added).
With all due respect to the First Circuit, bifurcating the analysis of entrapment does
not minimize the significance of predisposition. If a defendant cannot establish induce
ment, there is simply no need for the court to consider predisposition. The inquiry will end
here, and the defense of entrapment will fail. Hence, it is both prudent and practical for a
court to bifurcate the analysis of inducement and predisposition under the subjective ap
proach to entrapment and to require a defendant who raises the issue of entrapment to
satisfy the threshold inquiry of inducement. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
372-73 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
26. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
27. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
28. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448,
451-52.
29. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
30. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
31. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448-49, 452; accord, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d
Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see Comment, The Viability of the En
trapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 655-56 (1974).
32. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opinion);
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42, 451; see also Note, supra note 22,
at 1467-68 (since predisposition is a crucial issue in entrapment cases, and fatal, upon
proof, to the defense, the prosecution can defeat a claim of entrapment without establishing
the reasonableness of the governmental conduct). The Supreme Court remains committed
to this approach. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-90 (plurality opinion); United States v.
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The objective test for entrapment, as articulated by Justice Rob
erts in Sorrells v. United States,33 and by Justice Frankfurter in Sher
man v. United States,34 rejects the legislative-intent rationale of the
sUbjective analysis with emphasis placed upon the defendant's crimi
nal predisposition. They target the extent of governmental miscon
duct as the focal point of its inquiry.35 As Justice Frankfurter
critically observed in Sherman, a criminal statute is concerned exclu
sively with the definition and prohibition of certain conduct, not with
legislative concepts of standards of decency for police conduct in the
detection of criminal activity.36 Moreover, Justice Frankfurter indi
cated that seeking statutory guidance in the application of a fictitious
legislative intent would "distort analysis" and would result in the abdi
cation of judicial responsibility, in the face of legislative silence, "to
accommodate the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civi
lized methods adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern
criminals." 37
Justice Frankfurter also feared that emphasizing criminal predis
position would unnecessarily expose the defendant to juror prejudice.
He noted that the government, in order to prove that it had not en
trapped the accused, would be compelled to demonstrate a general
predisposition on his part "to commit, whenever the opportunity
should arise, crimes of the kind solicited . . . ."38 Such proof, Justice
Frankfurter observed, will frequently involve evidence of reputation,
prior disposition, and other criminal conduct. 39 He argued, however,
that this situation was pregnant with danger if the issue of entrapment
were submitted to a jury, for then the defendant would run "the sub
stantial risk that, in spite of instructions," the jury would be influenced
by "a criminal record or bad reputation" in assessing the ultimate is
sue of guilt or innocence. 4O
Justice Roberts, in his separate opinion in Sorrells, also objected
to the method of statutory interpretation employed by the Sorrells maRussell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30, 433-36 (1973)(5-4 decision)(reaffirrning the subjective test
and declining to overrule Sorrells and Sherman).
33. 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion).
34. 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
35. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976)(plurality opinion); see
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1973); Sherman 356 U.S. at 382-84 (Frank
furter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., separate opin
ion); see a/so Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36.
36. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 382.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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jority, in that the behavior of the accused fell within the terms of the
applicable statute. 41 In addition, he accused the majority of establish
ing no criteria for determining when a statute should be read as ex
cluding cases of entrapment. 42
More fundamentally, however, the difference between the subjec
tive and objective tests for entrapment is one of theory. To endow the
doctrine of entrapment with a statutory premise is to lose sight of its
underlying function, which is to deny punishment for one who, while
not in any legal sense innocent, has been enticed or induced to crime
by law enforcement methods that fall below acceptable standards of
conduct. It is for this reason that the proponents of the objective test
have argued that it is the duty of the courts to close their doors to
prosecutions founded on government-manufactured crimes. 43
Although the legislative-intent rationale of the SUbjective ap
proach to entrapment has deprived the doctrine of a constitutional
footing44 and has tended to limit its scope,45 the doctrine, even in
shrunken form, retains its vitality as a means of deterring improper
law enforcement practices. 46 It involves the unjust procurement of
crime by government agents,47 and preserves the integrity of the
courts and of the criminal justice system. 48 The doctrine articulates a
philosophy of law that rejects punishment for one who has been in
duced by government agents to engage in criminal activity.49 The de
fense that it affords is available, not as a vehicle for freeing the guilty,
but as a means of prohibiting the prosecution and conviction of indi
viduals for criminal conduct instigated and procured by government
agents.50 Strictly speaking, entrapment is, therefore, neither a defense
41. Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
42. Id. at 456-57.
43. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s,
287 U.S. at 455-59 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
44. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973)(since the defense of en
trapment "is not of a constitutional dimension," Congress may properly "adopt any sub
stantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable" (footnote omited».
45. See id. at 435.
46. For a discussion of the deterrence rationale of entrapment, see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.10 commentary at 14 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, supra
note 21, § 48, at 372; Park, supra note 23, at 242.
47. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 256, at 785 (2d ed.
1961).
48. Park, supra note 23, at 242; see United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th
Cir. 1975)(en banc); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1112; Note, supra note 22, at 1456-57.
49. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 452.
50. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s,
287 U.S. at 452; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 46, § 2.10 commentary at 14-15.
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nor an excuse for crime in any conventional legal sense. 51 This has
prompted one court to observe that rather than being perceived as a
defense, entrapment should be "treated as a fact inconsistent with
guilt."52 While law enforcement conduct is not in any strictly techni
cal sense a legal defense under the principles of entrapment, and can
not excuse a criminal offense, "it does not follow that the court must
suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished."53 Such a result
would be beyond any conceivable legislative intent in enacting the stat
ute or statutes alleged to have been violated by the defendant. 54 The
issue of entrapment, as framed, is not concerned with the judicial
power over the admission and exclusion of evidence.55 The doctrine
implicates the power to release an accused who has committed a crim
inal offense. 56 The power of clemency, however, may be exercised
only by the executive branch of government.57 Thus, the doctrine ap
pears to be rooted in an ethical and social judgement. When society,
through its law enforcement officers, has instigated and caused an indi
vidual's action or behavior, it is unjust for that society to insist upon
punishment for such conduct. 58
It follows, therefore, that the crucial issue raised by the doctrine
of entrapment "is not whether the particular offense was brought
about by the government agent, but rather whether the government
agent brought about the defendant's predisposition to crime."59 It is
precisely because of the limiting scope of this inquiry, with its focus
upon "the defendant's predisposition to crime," however, that the
predisposed defendant is particularly vulnerable to outrageous acts of
misconduct by the police in their zeal to ferret out criminals. But, as
the subjective rationale teaches, he may not invoke the aid of the prin
ciples of entrapment. A finding of predisposition is fatal to a claim of
51. See Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts. J., separate opinion); Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (I928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52. State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 135,249 A.2d 238, 239 (1968); see McCarroll
v. State, 294 Ala. 87, 88, 312 So. 2d 382, 383 (1975) (defense of entrapment "rests on the
defendant's admitting the deed but disclaiming the thought"); see also United States v.
Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (the court, in dictum, appeared to recognize
that invoking the doctrine of entrapment concedes the commission of the offense charged).
53. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372;
Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 448-49, 452.
55. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1960).
56. Id.
57. See Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 449; Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916)(the
"right to relieve" from punishment rests with the executive).
58. See Note, supra note 55, at 1335.
59. Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351,462 N.E.2d 80,83 (1984)(em
phasis added).
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entrapment. 6O It is here that the need for a new and more broadly
perceived concept of deterrence is particularly pressing. That need is
twofold: to protect all citizens, including predisposed individuals and
those only suspected of criminal predisposition, from unscrupulous
law enforcement officials; and to devise a national standard proscrib
ing police practices that shock the conscience and offend one's sense of
justice. Hence, it is necessary for a due process defense based upon
outrageous governmental conduct to fully satisfy the above criteria. 61
III.
A.

THE RIGHT To

A

DUE PROCESS DEFENSE

Introductory Comments

The argument concerning the feasibility, or desirability, of plac
ing a due process limitation upon the degree and scope of police in
volvement in crime, is not truly an argument about law enforcement.
Rather, it is an argument about government, and more specifically, the
role and quality of government in a free society. If we have learned
anything about the relationship between government and its citizens
since the founding of this nation, it is that the options available to any
society are limited, either to a community in which government is the
servant of the people or to a state in which the interests of the individ
ual are subordinated to the will and power of arbitrary government.
The choice is stark, but clear-cut. It will tell us much about the qual
ity of such a civilization.
Nowhere is this choice more sharply defined than in the adminis
tration of the criminal law, "that most awesome aspect of govern
ment. . . "62 It is to this subject that the thrust of this article is
directed. This article attempts to demonstrate that the quality of a
60. See authorities cited supra note 24.
61. Although the defense of entrapment is not availvable to a predisposed defendant,
a separate due process defense, based solely upon governmental misconduct, may be in
voked by any person accused of crime. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1007
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v.
United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,
518-19, 523-24, 378 N.E.2d 78, 81,84-85,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717, 721 (1978); see also
United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377-79 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Per
luss V. United States, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)(entertaining, but rejecting, a claim of due pro
cess deprivation from predisposed defendants, without specifically endorsing criteria for
standing); Greene, 454 F.2d at 786-87 (entertaining, and sustaining, a claim of due process
deprivation from predisposed defendants, without specifically endorsing criteria for stand
ing); State V. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 270-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(same). This latter
defense has been accorded constitutional status. United States V. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 12
(3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); see United States V. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en
banc), cerE. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
62. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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civilization is properly judged by the methods employed in the en
forcement of its criminal laws, 63 and that the quality of such methods
must be measured against the standards of fundamental fairness under
the rubric of due process. Although the concept of due process does
not lend itself to rigid analysis, its ability to adapt to changing circum
stances and to incorporate the accumulated wisdom of experience,64
makes it ideally suited to the task of defining, in terms of concrete
examples, the permissible limits of law enforcement involvement in the
detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals. The experience
may not always lend itself to easy and simple resolution, but a free
society dare not shirk its responsibility to make the necessary commit
ment to controlling the awesome police power of the state.

B.

The Concept of Due Process

The American system of criminal justice, with its emphasis upon
accusatorial proceedings governed by the presumption of innocence,65
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,66 and the require
ment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,67 has sought "to balance the
scales in the contest between government and citizen. "68 One of the
key elements in this endeavor is the concept of substantive due pro
cess, with its emphasis upon fundamental fairness 69 and civilized de
cency70 by government in its dealings with the individual.
Due process is not cast in a rigid mold. It embodies a concept
that has evolved historically. It is neither fixed nor finaJ.71 In short,
due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unre
63. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
64. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
65. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978).
66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex. rei.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15 & n.12 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41
(1961).
67. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197,210 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
68. Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil
Contempt Proceedings, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 601, 628 (1983)(footnote omitted); see
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)(one of the "fundamental values"
that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination implements is "our sense of fair
play which dictates" a fair balance in the contest between the state and the individual); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 317-18 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
69. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., concur
ring in the judgment); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978).
70. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
71. Id. at 168-72; see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25
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lated to time, place and circumstances."72 Rather, it represents "a
summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal im
munities" which are "fundamental" and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. "73
Justice Frankfurter has described due process as a legal concept
in these terms: "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in
our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wis
dom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living prin
ciple not confined to past instances."74 Many attempts have been
made to precisely define this "most majestic concept." The attempts
have proved to be somewhat unsuccessful,75 primarily because of the
"vague contours"76 and comprehensive scope of due process. 77 What
can be distilled from these efforts, however, is that the essence of due
process is "an abiding sense of fundamental fairness in the relations
between government and citizen, "78 and "the sense of fair
play. . . ."79
The meaning of "fundamental fairness," which extends to the in
dividual the "most comprehensive protection of liberties,"80 and em
braces a noble ideal, "can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."81
Applying due process "is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must
discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situa
tion"82 by scrutinizing all of the circumstances 83 in light of relevant
(1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (l951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)(Frank
furter, J., concurring); accord, Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
73. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937».
74. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951)(Frank
furter, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
75. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
76. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,170 (1952).
77. See id.
78. Mascolo, supra note 68, at 612; see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35
(1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Taylor v. Kentucky,
436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)(Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,236 (1941).
79. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
80. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
81. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981).
82. Id. at 24-25.
83. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494-95 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., con
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precedents, and assessing the competing interests at stake. 84
Two perceptions emerge from this summarized review of the
guiding principles of due process. First, is the trenchant commitment
to fair play and civilized decency in the relations between the state and
the individual. The picture is clear that due process "is not a fair
weather or timid assurance"85 to the individual in his insistence upon
freedom from arbitrary behavior and unscrupulous practices by gov
ernment and its agents. Second, and as a follow-up to this profound
commitment to the integrity and dignity of the individual, is the insis
tence upon fundamentally just standards of conduct by the state in the
event that the citizen becomes a target of a criminal investigation.
Due process intercedes here on behalf of the individual, not to tilt the
scales in his favor, but simply to balance the scales in any ensuing
contest with government. 86 And, it is precisely because of this com
prehensive guarantee that due process is a particularly attractive vehi
cle for checking government abuses in the administration of the
criminal justice system and the enforcement of the nation's penal
codes. Moreover, it is a concept that brings a sense of justice to crimi
nal proceedings and a message of civilized decency and fairness to all,
including those predisposed to crime, who deal with government.
Thus, it provides a protection that extends beyond the subjective prin
ciples of entrapment, with emphasis upon criminal predisposition and
denial of security to those with such propensity.87 Ultimately, and
most importantly, due process makes no attempt to weigh the equities
of the respective parties. It imposes solely upon government "respect
[for] certain decencies of civilized conduct"88 in its relations with citi
zens, irrespective of their guilt or innocence, or criminal propensity.
C.

Analysis and Discussion

In his memorable dissent in Olmstead v. United States,89 Justice
Brandeis articulated an equitable "clean hands" defense to the admis
sibility of evidence obtained by government as the result of the com
curring in the judgment); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result).
84. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
85. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)(Frank
furter, J., concurring).
86. See Mascolo, supra note 68, at 612-13.
87. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
88. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
89. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (l928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Olmstead was overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), on grounds unrelated to the context in which it
is used in this article.
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mission of criminal acts. Arguing that "a court will not redress a
wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands,"90 a maxim
that, although derived from principles of equity,91 "prevails also in
courts of law,"92 Justice Brandeis reasoned that where government is
the offending actor and seeks the remedies of the criminal law, the
reasons for applying the operating principle underlying the maxim
"are compelling."93
The "clean hands" maxim signifies that a litigant invoking the aid
of equity has himself been guilty of unscrupulous and deceitful con
duct violative of the fundamental concepts of equity jurisprudence.
He therefore is refused all recognition and affirmative relief with re
spect to the controversy at issue. 94 Thus, the maxim dictates that
whenever a plaintiff turns to equity for relief, but has been guilty of
inequitable conduct relative to the particular controversy, the court
will shut its doors to him in limine, and will refuse to interfere on his
behalf by denying to him any affirmative relief. 95
Applying the maxim to the criminal law, Justice Brandeis opined
that the ratio decidendi of "unclean hands" dictated that legal reme
dies would be denied to a prosecuting litigant who "has violated the
law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal
redress."96 The reasons for this, Justice Brandeis instructed, were "to
maintain respect for law[,]. .. to promote confidence in the adminis
tration ofjustice[,]. . . [and] to preserve the judicial process from con
tamination," regardless of any wrong committed by the defendant. 97
Accordingly, the doctrine of "unclean hands" in the criminal law is a
rule "not of action, but of inaction."98
In addition, the rule speaks to both substantive law and matters
of procedure. 99 Hence, Justice Brandeis observed that objection to the
government as one which "comes with unclean hands will be taken by
90. 277 u.S. at 483 (footnote omitted).
91. See Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935); Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 397, at 91, § 398, at 92-94 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941); 27 AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 136, at 666
67 (1966).
92. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
94. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 91, § 397, at 91; 27 AM. JUR.2d, supra note 91 § 136,
at 667; see Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935).
95. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 91, § 397, at 91-92; 27 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 91,
§ 136, at 667; see Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935).
96. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 484-85.
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the court itself," in order that "[t]he court [might] protect[] itself."loo
For these reasons, concluded Justice Brandeis, "[d]ecency, secur
ity[,] and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen." 101 If the rule were otherwise, argued Justice Brandeis, the
. very existence of government would be "imperilled" by its failure "to
observe the law scrupulously."102 Furthermore, by its example as "the
potent, the omnipresent teacher," the government, as lawbreaker, will
breed "contempt for law" and invite anarchy.103 To Justice Brandeis,
therefore, any attempt by government to introduce, into "the adminis
tration of the criminal law," the doctrine that "the end justifies the
means - to declare that the [g]overnment may commit crimes in or
der to secure the conviction of a private criminal- would bring terri
ble retribution." Against that "pernicious doctrine," he admonished,
"[c]ourt[s] should resolutely set [their] face[s]."I04
It is submitted that the doctrine of the equitable "clean hands"
defense, as enunciated by Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent,
bears particular relevance to the due process defense of outrageous
governmental conduct. It is consistent with the objective test for en
trapment lOS articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United
States,106 and by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States. 107
Those dissents focus on the extent of governmental misconduct rather
than the defendant's criminal predisposition.108 Under this test, it is
the duty of the courts to close their doors to prosecutions founded
upon governmental misconduct involving the inducement to or the
creation of crime. 109
Justice Roberts argued in Sorrells that the doctrine of entrapment
100. Id. at 485.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670,676-77 (2d Cir.
1973)(dictum)("[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime .
. . . Governmental 'investigation' involving participation in activities that result in injury
to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanc
tion." (footnote omitted»; see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47
(1943)(courts, as custodians of liberty, should not sanction convictions obtained by meth
ods offensive to a progressive society).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43.
106. 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)(Roberts, J., separate opinion).
107. 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
108. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
109. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion); see Sherman, 356
U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J.,
separate opinion); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102, 1112.
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must be rooted "in the public policy which protects the purity of gov
ernment and its processes" 110 from "the consummation of a wrong" III
perpetrated "by foul means," 112 and which closes the courts "to the
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents."1 13 In ad
dition, Justice Roberts reasoned that courts themselves possess "the
inherent right . . . not to be made the instrument of wrong."114
Hence, it is the moral imperative of a court to preserve "the purity of
its own temple" and "to protect itself and the government from such
prostitution of the criminallaw."1 15
Under this view of entrapment, there is no need for a distinction
based upon the nature of the offense. I16 Similarly, for Justice Roberts,
the issue of entrapment is not concerned with guilt or innocence, but
only with "the public policy which protects the purity of govern
ment"IJ7 and the moral integrity of the judiciary.118 It may be
brought to the attention of the court "at any stage of the case," and, if
established, requires the court to quash the indictment and to dis
charge the defendant. I19 It follows, according to Justice Roberts, that
the defendant's reputation and prior criminal activities are not legiti
mate subjects of the inquiry. I20 The inquiry is concerned only with the
preservation of judicial and governmental integrity.12I Finally, ac
cording to Justice Roberts, there is no place for balancing equities be
tween the accused and the government, because entrapment is not to
be condoned because of a defendant's reputation or prior transgres
sions without disregarding "the reason for refusing the processes of
the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction."122
Justice Frankfurter, in Sherman, was similarly persuaded~ For
him, an approach that focuses on the predisposition and character of
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 456.
115. Id. at 457. This analysis is but a reaffirmation of the position adopted by Justice
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928), where he confessed
to little, if any, distinction between government rewarding "its officers for having got evi
dence by crime" and government "pay[ing] them for getting it in the same way . . . ." Id.
at 470. In either case, government would be playing "an ignoble part." Id.
116. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 457; see Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (I 928)(Brandeis, I.,
dissenting); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1112.
119. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, I., separate opinion).
120. Id. at 458-59.
121. Id. at 455, 457, 458-59.
122. Id. at 459; Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102.
110.
111.
112.

1984]

ENTRAPMENT

17

the accused "loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of
entrapment." 123 The rationale of the doctrine from Justice Frank
furter's perspective is that regardless of the defendant's reputation or
past record for antisocial behavior and "present inclinations to crimi
nality, . . . certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is
not to be tolerated by an advanced society."124 Therefore, the police
should not be granted a blank check, including "inordinate induce
ments" in combatting the criminal elements of society,125 and should
not be accorded a roving commission to induce to crime persons who
are endeavoring to resist the temptation of such conduct. 126
Justice Frankfurter further argued that to ensure the objective
regulation of law enforcement conduct in apprehending "only those
ready and willing to commit crime,"127 which would be lacking if the
reasonableness of police conduct were evaluated in terms of the crimi
nal predisposition of the accused, the proper focus of inquiry must be
on the conduct of government agents. 128 For Justice Frankfurter, it
simply was not the function of government "to promote rather than
detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to
themselves, might well have obeyed the law."129 In sum, Justice
Frankfurter concluded that "[h]uman nature is weak enough and suffi
ciently beset by temptation without government adding to them and
generating crime."130
Crucial to the objective test for entrapment, developed by Justice
Roberts and Justice Frankfurter, is the recognition that the threat
posed to the integrity of both the criminal law and the judicial
processes lies not in the activity of the defendant, but rather in the
conduct of the government. Hence, the proper focus of a court's in
quiry will be on the government's activity and not on the behavior of
the accused. 131 Moreover, the thrust of this inquiry is dictated by the
doctrine that the judicial power should not be employed as an instru
123.
124.
125.
126.

Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 383-84. It should be pointed out, however, that this position partially

overlaps the sUbjective test for entrapment, in that it appears to emphasize the lack of
criminal predisposition. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (I 976)(plural
ity opinion); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (I 973)(majority opinion); Sher
man, 356 U.S. at 372-73 (majority opinion); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42, 451 (majority
opinion).
127. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at
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ment for the enforcement of the criminal law by means that are unjust.
This is "a fundamental rule of public policy,"132 and is grounded in
the power of the judiciary "to protect itself and the government from
such prostitution of the criminal law." 133 The genesis of this position
is rooted in the policy of judicial integrity.134
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Casey v. United
States,135 adopted a similar approach. He reasoned that a prosecution
based upon entrapment should be terminated in order to protect the
government from the illegal conduct of its agents, and to "preserve the
purity of its courtS."136 This decision to terminate, Justice Brandeis
believed, had nothing to do with the denial of any rights of the defend
ant. 137 Thus, he did not place entrapment on a constitutional footing.
As Justice Brandeis perceived the situation, the conduct of the
government and its officers was not a defense to the defendant. For
him, governmental misconduct could not excuse the violation of crimi
nal statutes. 138 But it did not follow, reasoned Justice Brandeis, that a
"court must suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished."139 To
do so in his view would be tantamount to ratification by government
of the misconduct of its officers. l40 This Justice Brandeis could not
sanction. In order to protect government from the "illegal conduct of
its officers,"141 and to "preserve the purity of its courts,"142 he would
dismiss indictments and deny to government the use of the judicial
process to seek convictions in cases involving official misconduct in the
apprehension and prosecution of criminals. 143 It is apparent, there
fore, that Justice Brandeis based his analysis of entrapment upon con
siderations of both public policy and judicial integrity, and implicitly
invoked the supervisory powers of courts as a means of preserving the
382-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 456-59 (Roberts, J.,
separate opinion).
132. Sorrel/s, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).

133. Id.
134. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting);
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 483-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Donnelly,
supra note 24, at 1112.
135. 276 U.S. 413,421 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 425.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 423.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 423-24, 425.
14l. Id. at 425.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 423-25.
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integrity of courts and deterring illegal conduct by government or im
proper practices by the police. l44
When government engages in the "dirty business"14s of inducing
or manufacturing crime, it comes into court with more than unclean
hands: it comes into court with unclean hands that have sullied and
violated the very law that government is charged with obeying and
protecting. The courts are similarly charged with upholding and re
specting the law. They are also under a duty to protect their functions
and preserve "the purity of [their] own temple[s]. ..."146 Against
such pernicious conduct, courts "should resolutely set [their]
face[s],"147 and firmly shut their doors.
If the result is to free a criminal, we as a people will have the
satisfaction of knowing that the Constitution is being vindicated, 148 for
"it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disre
gard of the charter of its own existence."149 We should not forget that
the rule of law lso in this country was designed to protect all of us 
the innocent and the guilty - from rule by tyranny. lSI The choice
may not be easy, but it is one that must be made. We live under "a
government of laws, and not of men,"IS2 and it is the duty of all of
ficers of government, "from the highest to the lowest," to obey the
144. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (l983)(purpose of supervisory
power of courts includes preserving judicial integrity and deterring illegal conduct); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980)("we agree that the supervisory power serves
the 'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity"); United
States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983)(following Hasting).
145. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(condemning the seizure of
evidence by illegal means).
146. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
147. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
148. C[ United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(while
the police conduct in question did not reach the requisite level of outrageousness to offend
principles of due process, the court implicitly recognized that if it had, an acquittal would
have been compelled "so as to protect the Constitution").
149. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961)(emphasis added)(defending the exclu
sion of illegally obtained evidence).
150. Cf United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,220 (I 882)(no man is above the law, and
all officers of government "are bound to obey it"); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)(the United States is "a government of laws, and not of
men").
151. Cf Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)(the
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures "protects all, those
suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
388-90 (A. Hamilton)(1831)(constitutional requirement of lifetime tenure for judicial of
ficers will secure the independence of the judiciary against legislative encroachments, and
protect the rights of the individual from majoritarian, as well as from tyrannical, excesses).
152. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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law.1S3 In a free and democratic society, it is a "less[er] evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an igno
ble part."154 To hold otherwise would "breed[] contempt for [the]
law,"155 and would reduce the Constitution to a "form of words," 156
or worse, to a dead letter. It is not a proper office of the judiciary to
sanction, however indirectly, the lawless enforcement of the criminal
law, or to have any hand "in such dirty business. . . ."157 Nor should
the prosecutor forget that, as a representative "of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all,"158 his interest is to see that "justice shall be done"159
within a legal framework of proper and legitimate methods employed
by law enforcement officials in ferreting out crime. Although it is un
derstandable that prosecutors and their agents will tend to attach great
significance to the societal interest in uncovering crime and convicting
criminals, "the danger is that they will assign too little [weight] to the
rights of citizens to be free from government-induced criminality."I60
We live in a society "of ordered liberty. . . ."161 Clearly, how
ever, as this very concept implies, there can be no liberty without or
der.162 Furthermore, there can be no order when the peace and
security of society are threatened by "escalating crime in our cit
ies,"163 and when "[s]ociety [itself] is at war with the criminal
classes. . . ."164 Crime is a cancer that strikes at the social fabric of
the community, and it is a rash society indeed that is so foolhardy as
to think that it can endure with impunity the ravages wrought by un
checked and destructive criminal behavior.
Our concern about the evils of crime are real and legitimate. They
are worthy of a self-respecting people. Our concerns for the decencies
of life and for the integrity of civilized standards governing the con
duct of law enforcement officers combatting the criminal elements of
society are also worthy. Justice Frankfurter has described the admin
153. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
154. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
155. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
156. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
157. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Donnelly, supra note 24,
at 1112.
158. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
159. Id.
160. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973)(dictum).
161. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937).
162. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1941).
163. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,496 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring
in the jUdgment).
164. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
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istration of the criminal law as "that most awesome aspect of govern
ment. ..."165 Consistent with Justice Frankfurter's assessment, a
major theme 166 of this article has been that the quality of a civilization
may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement
of its criminal laws. 167 Thus, in our zeal to eradicate hoodlums and
Mafia chieftans, we should take care not to forget our heritage and
sense of fair play. Above all, we should not become criminals in our
desire, however reasonable and praiseworthy, to fight crime. 168 This is
a price that no enlightened society can afford to pay. It would be an
awesome loss to gain security at the cost of offending our sense of
justice and discrediting our commitment to the integrity of the rule of
law. "Decency, security and liberty alike"169 dictate against such a
tragic result. Ultimately, it would be liberty itself that would be lost in
the excesses of unrestrained police practices that are repugnant to a
criminal justice system that is constructed upon a moral foundation of
fundamental fairness in the relations between government and its citi
zens. Therefore, it is both the legal and the moral duty of government
in a progressive society to enforce its criminal laws pursuant to a sense
of justice and fairness, and within the limits of civilized standards of
conduct.
.
It is true that crime has been a serious social problem in the urban
centers of this nation. 170 In addition, criminal endeavors have become
increasingly sophisticated and ingenious, as well as clandestine. This,
in turn, has dramatically increased the burdens placed upon law en
forcement authorities, especially in countering effectively the ex
panding drug practices in our cities.l7l It is not suprising, therefore,
that the police have turned with increasing frequency to the services of
informants and undercover agents as useful tools in combatting crime
165.

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5, 62-64.
167. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962); see Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949)(plurality opinion); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47
(1943); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. I, 25-26
(1956).
168. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion) (although it is the function of
law enforcement to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, "[m]anifestly, that function
does not include the manufacturing of crime."); see id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result)(it is not the function of government "to promote rather than detect crime and
to bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might well have obeyed the
law").
169. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
170. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concur
ring in the jUdgment).
171. See id. at 495-96 n.7.
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and penetrating criminal enterprises and conspiracies.172
Justice Roberts has described the conflict and resultant tension
between society and the criminal elements in colorful terms:
Society is at war with the criminal classes, and courts have uni
formly held that in waging this warfare the forces of prevention and
detection may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of
the commission of crime. Resort to such means does not render an
indictment thereafter found a nullity nor call for the exclusion of
evidence so procured. 173

Thus, a criminal prosecution will not be aborted simply because the
government resorted to deceit l74 or obtained "evidence [of guilt] by
artifice or deception."175 Neither may the doctrine of entrapment be
invoked where government agents have only provided the opportu
nity, or furnished the facilities, for the commission of crime. 176 Simi
larly, mere evidence of solicitation is not sufficient to raise the issue of
entrapment. 177 And a feigned friendship, or one offered under false
pretenses, is not, as a matter of law, entrapment. 17S
Nowhere is this need for "stealth and strategy"179 more pro
nounced than in the efforts of government to stamp out the drug trade.
Simply stated, informants and undercover agents are crucial to com
batting drug-related and other contraband offenses. ISO In fact, they
have even been permitted to supply drugs and other things of value to
172. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., separate opinion);
United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Brown,
635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984)(de
fense conceded the propriety of such services); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 524, 378
N.E.2d 78, 85,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 721 (1978).
173. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(footnote omitted);
see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973).
174. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973).
175. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (majority opinion), and id. at 454 (Roberts, J., separate
opinion); see Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351, 462 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1984); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, supra note 21, § 48, at 369.
176. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372
(majority opinion), and id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 441; see Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 424 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
177. See United States v. Luce, 726 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1984); Kadis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351,
462 N.E.2d 80, 83-84 (1984); Donnelly, supra note 24, at 1102.
178. United States v. Jones, 487 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Quevedo, 399 F.2d 307, 308 (9th Cir. 1968)(per curiam). Cj United States v. Ladley, 517
F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1975)(discussing tactics found not to constitute entrapment).
179. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
180. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concur
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criminal enterprises in order to gain the confidence of those involved
in illicit activities. 181
But after conceding the practical everyday difficulties of combat
ting modern criminal enterprises, and acknowledging the useful role of
informers and undercover operations in exposing and solving crime, 182
the fact remains that "there are limits to what either an informant or
an undercover agent may dO."183 The courts may not "shirk the re
sponsibility that is necessarily in [their] keeping . . . to accomodate
the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods ad
equate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals."184 Therefore,
the courts must be prepared to confront those situations involving law
enforcement techniques employed against the criminal elements of so
ciety where, as a result of government participation in, or creation of,
crime, "there comes a time when enough is more than enough - iris
just too much. When that occurs, the law must condemn it as offensive
[to due process] whether the method used is refined or crude, subtle or
spectacular."185 It may ultimately be only "a question of degree," 186
but, by the exercise of sound judicial judgment, "[a] standard must be
set somewhere and the line should be drawn"187 where government
induces and effectively controls criminal activities in a manner that
can only encourage lawlessness. 188 At that level of official misconduct,
due process must step in and call a halt to any "prosecution conceived
in or nurtured by such [outrageous] conduct . . . ."189
Such conduct can be neither sanctioned nor tolerated, for it is
ring in the jUdgment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1978).
181. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); see also Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976)(plurality opinion)(practice implicitly endorsed),
and id. at 491-92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Lomas, 706
F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Margolis V. United States, 104 S. Ct.
720 (1984) (defense acknowledged permissibility of such practices).
182. See Williamson V. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J.,
concurring specially).
183. United States V. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.)(per curiam)(emphasis
added), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 445 U.S. 954 (1980).
184. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
185. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962)(Brown, J., con
curring specially)(emphasis added); accord, People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 523, 378
N.E.2d 78, 84,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,721 (1978); see Note, supra note 22, at 1471-72.
186. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 523, 378 N.E.2d 78, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
721 (1978).
187. Id. at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
188. See id. at 521-24, 378 N.E.2d at 83-85, 406 N.Y.S. at 719-21; see also United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum).
189. People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78,83,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
719-20 (1978).
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simply not a legitimate function of government to engage in crime. 190
Justice Holmes, within the context of the illegal seizure of evidence,
has admonished the courts, as a branch oj government, that if "the
existing code [of decency and fundamental fairness)" does not permit
the prosecution "to have a hand in such dirty business [of securing
evidence of crime by illegal acts]," it will "not permit the judge to
allow such iniquities to succeed."191 For Justice Holmes, there was
"no distinction . . . between the government as prosecutor and the
government as judge." 192 Further, it was but a deductive and logical
conclusion that if evidence was inadmissible for having been obtained
by unconstitutional means, it was also excludable for having been ob
. tained by illegal acts of government agents.193 Therefore, while the
detection of criminals was a "desirable" end of effective law enforce
ment, for Justice Holmes it was more "desirable that the government
should not itself Joster and pay for other crimes" in securing evidence
of guilt. 194 Accordingly, Justice Holmes was prepared to choose, as "a
less[er] evil[,] that some criminals should escape than that the govern
ment should play an ignoble part."195
An argument might be made that defining the limits of law en
forcement involvement in crime without focusing on a defendant's
predisposition will raise doctrinal and practical difficulties for the
courtS. 196 Although such an argument raises legitimate issues, it
should not be overlooked that the very essence of delineating these
limits is to define fundamental fairness at particular times, in particu
lar places, and within particular contexts. This is a task for which the
courts are uniquely equipped to arrive at a just result by assessing and
reasonably accommodating the competing interests at stake of the gov
ernment, to detect and punish criminals, and of the individual, to be
treated fairly within a framework of justice and decency. It is the
purpose of constitutions "to preserve practical and substantial rights,
not to maintain theories,"197 and it is the penultimate responsibility of
the courts to implement this goal. No other institution of government
is so well-qualified to discharge this awesome duty, even when "there
190. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Franfkfurter, J., concurring in the result); Olm
stead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
191. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 471.
194. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494-95 & nn.5-6 (I 976)(Powell, J.,
concurring in the jUdgment).
197. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).

ENTRAPMENT

1984)

25

is sometimes no sharply defined standard against which to make these
judgments . . . ."198
Finally, the most appealing aspects of the due process defense are
its constitutional basis and the scope of its protection. These factors
are interrelated and demonstrate the clear and present need for the
defense. First, the defense will place both the federal and state law
enforcement authorities of this nation under a charge that they will be
required to satisfy, at a minimum, certain standards of decency and
fair play in their investigation and apprehension of criminals. Second,
by reason of its constitutional footing, the defense will apply to all
alike, the innocent, the guilty, and the criminally predisposed. Thus,
the defense is national in scope. It fills the protective gaps, both doc
trinal and factual, created by the subjective test for entrapment with
its parochial preoccupation with criminal propensity.
D.

Dynamics of the Defense
1.

Distinguished from Entrapment

Although the due process defense is "a close relative of entrap
ment,"199 it is independent. 2°O It differs from entrapment in several
important ways. In the first place, entrapment generally presents a
question of fact, unless the defendant, as a matter of law, has estab
lished it beyond a reasonable doubt. 201 Due process involves govern
mental misconduct and, therefore, presents a question of law.202
This result would appear, upon initial impression, to be somewhat
at odds with the legal perception of due process as a flexible concept
198. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.6 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment); see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-73 (1952).
199. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
200. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), eert. denied sub nom.
Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see United States v. Hunt, 36 CRIM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2203, 2203 (4th Cir. Nov. 28, 1984) ("entrapment and due process claims . . .
are analytically distinct"); United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), eert. denied,
419 U.S. 1031 (1974).
201. United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1321 (5th Cir. 1977), eert. denied, 435
U.S. 923 (1978); Goss v. United States, 376 F.2d 812,813 (5th Cir. 1967)(per curiam); see
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377; United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.)(per
curiam), eert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 445 U.S. 954 (1980); United States
v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Peppars, 140 Cal. App. 3d 677, 685,
189 Cal. Rptr. 879, 884 (1st Dist. 1983).
202. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States
v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179,
181-82 (1st Cir. 1977), eert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d
268, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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which derives its meaning from "time, place and circumstances."203
Closer examination, however, dispels the confusion. The essential
meaning of due process is fundamental fairness. 204 If a determination
of a denial of fundamental fairness were simply an issue of fact to be
"left to a jury's unguided discretion, ... the [due process] defense as
now understood would be transformed into an invitation to twelve ju
rors to consider in virtually any case whether [a] defendant was
treated 'fairly.' "205 This, a jury is not "equipped" to do. Therefore, it
"should not be permitted to speculate on whether particular facts do
or do not amount to fundamental fairness."206 Moreover, since the
due process defense strikes at "the legality of law enforcement meth
ods," the determination of the lawfulness of governmental conduct is a
legal issue w~iCh. "must be made . . . by the trial judge, not the
jury."207
Ultimately, however, the very nature of due process as an evolv
ing concept with "vague contours" and a "continuing process of appli
cation" which defies meaning that is "final and fixed"208 precludes, as
a practical necessity, as well as a constitutional precept, the participa
tion of jurors in the task of determining when misconduct by govern
ment has offended our sense of justice and shocked the conscience. 209
Therefore, if the issue of due process misconduct were a question of
fact, a jury would be called upon to interpret a constitutional concept
- a task that has been entrusted to the courts. As Justice Frankfurter
has observed:
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man,
and more particularly between the individual and government, "due
process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of Dudi
cial] decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the demo
cratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical
instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judg
ment by those Dudicial officers] whom the Constitution entrusted
203. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
205. United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1075 (1978).
206. Id.; see United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980)(since
the due process defense is based upon defects in the institution of a prosecution, "this
defense is properly decided by the court and not the jury.").
207. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
208. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
209. Cj id. at 169-73 (implicitly endorsing the constitutional duty of the judiciary to
interpret and apply due process as an evolutionary concept).
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with the unfolding of the process. 210

The second major distinction between due process and entrap
ment lies in the availability of the due process defense to a predisposed
defendant,211 while proof of predisposition is fatal to a claim of entrap
ment,212 even though the accused may not have given the police rea
sonable cause to suspect, prior to their investigation, that he was
engaged in criminal activity.213 In addition, the due process defense is
one of constitutional dimension,214 while the defense of entrapment is
not. 215
The respective scopes of the two defenses highlight the fourth and
final major distinction between due process and entrapment.
Although both doctrines provide relief from government misconduct
in the enforcement of the criminal law, the scope of the' due process
protection extends beyond that of entrapment 216 and reaches "[p]olice
overinvolvement in crime [which attains] a demonstrable level of out
rageousness"217 that is sufficient to shock the conscience and a sense of
justice.
In spite of these differences, however, the due process defense
does tend "to overlap with the entrapment defense."218 This has con
tributed to a difficulty in delineating "the conduct circumscribed by
the due process defense. . . ."219 Moreover, as the Third Circuit has
observed, "the lines between the objective test of entrapment favored
by a minority of the [Supreme Court] [j]ustices and the due process
defense accepted by a majority of the [j]ustices are indeed
hazy. . . ."220 This, in turn, has prompted some federal circuits to
210. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177-80 (1803)(it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is and to interpret
constitutions).
211. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying note 60.
213. See United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1977), cerro denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978); United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977); Note, supra note 22, at 1467-68.
214. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
215. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432-33 (1973).
216. Cf United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982)("a successful due process defense must be predicated on intolerable
government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense").
217. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring
in the jUdgment).
218. United States V. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cerr. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
219. [d.
220. [d. at 608.
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adopt the postion that courts should be careful "not to undermine the
[Supreme] Court's consistent rejection of the objective test of entrap
ment by permitting it to reemerge cloaked as a due process
defense."221
2.

Scope of the Defense

a.

Governing Principles

Once a court is prepared to recognize the existence of a due pro
cess defense, it must then determine the limits of such a defense. It
has been observed, concerning this issue, that while the scope of the
due process defense is "potentially broad, [it] has in fact been severely
restricted"222 to a level of misconduct that shocks the conscience and a
sense of justice. 223 - This degree of outrageousness has been character
ized as "go[ing] beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment de
fense."224 Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to reverse a
conviction because of pervasive involvment of government in crime;225
and the federal circuits, to date, have done so in only two cases,226
which involved the generation or manufacture of crimes solely for pur
poses of prosecution. 227 Still, as these examples imply, the perception
of offensive behavior must be sufficiently broad to permit that degree
of flexibility required for the "delicate [and ongoing] process of adjust
ment"228 that permits due process to grow through experience and
adapt to changing circumstances. 229 Closely related to this inquiry are
the standards of fairness against which a court will objectively mea
221. Id.; accord, United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir.) (Gins
burg, J.,separate opinion)(lower federal courts "may not alter the contours of the entrap
ment defense under a due process cloak")(footriote omitted), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264
(1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524
(1983).
222. United States v. Ramirez, 7 \0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
223. See id.; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cen.
denied, 457 U.S. 1 \06 (1982)("the majority of the [Supreme] Court has manifestly reserved
for the constitutional defense [of due process] only the most intolerable government con
duct"); cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952)(conduct that shocks the con
science and offends a sense of justice is conduct that violates the principles of due process).
224. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cen. denied, 457
U.S. 1 \06 (1982).
225. United States v. Ramirez, 7 \0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
226. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
227. United States v. Ramirez, 7\0 F.2d 535, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1983).
228. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
229. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 174 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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sure police conduct. Here, the states are not limited to the minimum
standards mandated by the United States Constitution as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, and may "impose higher standards on law en
forcement practices pursuant to their own constitutions."23o
Invoking the principles of due process as a restraint upon the
power of government to seek judicial procedures in obtaining criminal
convictions is a doctrine of ancient origin, and is traceable to the
Magna Charta.231 A classic example of the doctrine is when govern
ment agents obtain evidence of crime by brutalizing a defendant. Such
conduct goes beyond merely offending "some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energeti
cally."232 Rather, "[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience,"233
and a conviction resulting from such methods offends; our sense of jus
tice and fair play and the standards of civilized conduct. 234
The degree of misconduct, however, which will warrant the bar
ring of prosecution, should not be restricted to situations involving
police brutality that rivals "the rack and the screw"235 in its assault
upon human dignity.236 To do so would drastically reduce the scope
of protection provided by the due process defense. 237 Furthermore, it
would unduly hamper the duty of courts "[t]o prevent improper and
unwarranted police solicitation of crime. . . ."238 It would simply be
stretching credulity to equate brutality with "solicitation." Neither
would "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime [that] . . . reach[ed] a de
230. Mascolo, Probable Cause Revisited: Some Disturbing Implications Emanating
from Illinois v. Gates, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 331,402 (1983); accord. People v. Isaacson,
44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78,82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1978)(applying higher
standards to due process defense); see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-504 (1977); cf Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967)(dictum)(acknowledging the right of the states to impose, as a matter of
state law, higher standards on searches and seizures than are required by the federal
Constitution).
231. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78,82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
719 (1978).
232. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 172-74; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936); Lomas,
706 F.2d at 891; United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1031 (1974).
235. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
236. See People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714,719 (1978); The Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57,252 (l973)(herein
after cited as Supreme Court Term); Comment, supra note 31, at 666-67, 669.
237. See Supreme Court Term, supra note 236, at 252.
238. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520-21, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83,406 N.Y.S.2d
714, 719 (1978)(emphasis added).
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monstrable level of outrageousness"239 - the level of misconduct in
sisted upon by Justice Powell to trigger the due process defense - be
confined to acts of brutality. Partners in crime, the situation envi
sioned by the due process defense, are not in the business of brutaliz
ing, or physically coercing, one another into criminal activity.
Moreover, government induces one to crime not merely by acts of in
timidation but also by promises of profit or advantage. Similarly, gov
ernment involvement in the planning, execution, and control of crime
can become unconstitutionally pervasive without also attaining the
level of brutality involving "physical or psychological coercion that
'shocks the conscience.' "240
239. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495 n.7 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment).
240. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 n.l3 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J.,
separate opinion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). Judge Ginsburg, in her separate
opinion in Kelly, interpreted Supreme Court precedent as limiting the due process defense
to acts of" 'coercion, violence[,] or brutality to the person.' " Id. (quoting Irvine v. Califor
nia, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954)(p1ura1ity opinion». In reaching this conclusion, Judge Gins
burg appears to have relied upon Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (l954)(plurality
opinion), and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). However, the plurality in Irvine
was quick to distinguish that case, as Judge Ginsburg herself acknowledged, from Rochin,
relied upon by the defendant, which involved the forcible extraction of evidence from
Rochin's body by means of a stomach pump. It was within this framework that Justice
Jackson, writing for the Irvine plurality, observed that "[h]owever obnoxious are the facts
in the case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence[,] or brutality to the person [as
did Rochin]." Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's trenchant condem
nation of the forcible extraction of the contents of the Rochin defendant's stomach as "con
duct that shocks the conscience," Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, did not imply a due process
restriction to such offensive methods. To the contrary, his exhaustive analytical treatment
of due process in Rochin. id. at 169-73, as a product of history and a flexible concept that
provided the "most comprehensive protection of liberties," id. at 170, speaks to an opposite
result. Thus, any reliance upon either Irvine or Rochin in support of restrictions upon the
scope of the due process defense is simply misplaced. Even Judge Ginsburg conceded that
such a limitation upon the reach of the defense would exclude from due process protection
"flagrant misconduct on the part of the police. . . ." Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, appears to have accepted
Judge Ginsburg's assessment of the Supreme Court precedents. See Commonwealth v.
Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 354-55,462 N.E.2d 80, 85 (1984).
Judge Ginsburg's restrictive concept of the due process defense is particularly perplex
ing. in view of her reliance upon Justice Powell's standard of "[p]olice overinvolvement in
crime [that] . . . reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness," Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (l976)(Powell, J .• concurring in the judgment), as the "requi
site level of outrageousness" to offend due process. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476 (Ginsburg, J.,
separate opinion). Clearly, however. Justice Powell's standard encompasses more than
" 'coercion. violence[,] or brutality to the person,' " id., or police brutality involving "physi
calor psychological coercion that 'shocks the conscience,''' id. at 1476 n.l3 (interpreting
lower federal precedents). See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376-81 (3d Cir. 1978);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Glasson, 36 CRIM.
L. REP. 2380, 2380-81, (Fla. Jan. 17, 1985) (applying defense to prosecutions based upon
the testimony of vital state informants who stand to gain a fee conditioned upon their
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Conduct that is repugnant to fundamental fairness and standards
of civilized decency - conduct that shocks the conscience and offends
a sense of justice - does not lend itself to rigid analysis or formal
exactitude. 241 It can arise in a variety of situations depending upon
time, place, and surrounding circumstances, as well as the nature of
the crime in question and the manner in which the particular criminal
activity is usually engaged in or carried on.242 Moreover, encounters
between government and citizen are too multifaceted and diverse to fit
into a neat equation of what is acceptable and what is unacceptable
conduct that will govern all situations, irrespective of time, place, and
circumstance. Thus, the limits of conduct repugnant to a sense of jus
tice, and, therefore, offensive to due process, defy the constrictions of
precise formulation and rigid conceptualization.
The scope of the defense must extend as far as the remedy de
manded by the peculiar government conduct in question. Regardless
of the means employed, the ends remain the same: On one hand, the
government's objective is the inducement of the citizen to crime, by
whatever methods are effective, to secure a conviction. The court's
remedy, on the other hand, is to protect the citizen from such conduct
by denying to the government the aid of the judicial processes. Hence,
the scope of the due process defense will be defined by the means em
ployed by government to obtain impermissible ends: the apprehension
and conviction of citizens for "government-induced criminality."243
The key element in this mix of factors will be the degree of govern
ment involvement in the criminal enterprise. If the government has
manufactured a crime to secure a conviction, then the defense will
intercede to prevent a conviction, not for the benefit of the defendant,
but "to protect the Constitution. "244 This test, which is rooted in no
tions of decency and fair play, applies an objective analysis to law en
forcement conduct, and measures that conduct against due process
standards of fundamental fairness, irrespective of the criminal predis
position of the defendant. 245
cooperation and testimony); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 268-70, 274 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982).
241. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
719 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 421-24.
242. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the re
sult)(applying criteria to conduct condemned under the objective analysis of entrapment).
243. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum).
244. United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); see United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. I 973)(dictum).
245. See Comment, supra note 31, at 669.
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The Direct Violation of a Protected Right of the Defendant

A fundamental aspect of the scope of the due process defense ad
dresses the issue of limiting its application to instances of police mis
conduct that directly infringes upon or violates some protected right
of a defendant. This issue not only implicates the scope of the defense
but also calls into question the very quality of the defense. To be more
specific, does the due process defense against outrageous government
conduct in the enforcement of the criminal law create a right on behalf
of each individual to be protected from government-induced criminal
ity, or does the defense apply only when the misconduct directly vio
lates some protected right of the defendant that exists independently of
the government's activity or behavior?
By way of dictum in United States v. Russell,246 the Supreme
Court suggested the existence of the due process defense: "[W]e may
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob
tain a conviction . . . ."247 As support for this proposition, the Court
cited 248 Rochin v. California. 249 Rochin involved the forcible extrac
tion of evidence from the defendant's body by methods that
"shock[ed] the conscience"250 of the Court - a stomach pump. The
Supreme Court condemned these procedures as going beyond merely
offending "some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically."25 1 These were, in the
Court's perception, "methods too close to the rack and the screw"252
to pass constitutional muster, and clearly offended due process253 by
their brutal disregard of the "decencies of civilized conduct."254 Thus,
the Court, in Rochin, would not tolerate convitions secured "by meth
ods that offend 'a sense of justice.' "255
In United States v. Archer,256 the government argued that the
Supreme Court's reference to Rochin in the Russell dictum confirmed
that it perceived the due process defense as one limited to conduct
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Id. at 431-32 (dictum).
Id. at 432.
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 173.
Id.; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
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which shocked the judicial conscience and directly infringed upon the
rights of a defendant. 257 The Second Circuit, while finding it unneces
sary to decide this issue because reversal was warranted on another
ground,258 appeared to endorse a broader application of the defense
than that advocated by the government,259 It incorporated the princi
ples articulated by Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent 260 and sug
gested the existence of a general due process right "of citizens to be
free from government-induced criminality."261 Judge Friendly states:
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in
crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government
agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence
to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental "in
vestigation" involving participation in activities that result in injury
to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be ex
tremely reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents natu
rally tend to assign great weight to the societal interest in
apprehending and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will
assign too little to the rights of citizens to be free from government
induced criminality.262
As this passage clearly suggests, the Archer court was prepared, if the
situation had arisen, to withhold the judicial processes from the prose
cution of even "a gang of hoodlums" for government-instigated crime.
The only opportunity that the Supreme Court has had to indi
rectly address the limits of the due process defense was presented in
Hampton v. United States. 263 In Hampton, a plurality264 of the Court,
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, appeared to have implicitly re
jected the defense in the case of a predisposed defendant, and to have
limited its scope to direct infringement of the rights of a defendant. 265
In the words of the plurality: "The limitations of . . . [d]ue
[p]rocess. . . come into play only when the [g]overnment activity in
question violates some protected right of the defendant."266 But, for
257. [d. at 676.
258. [d. at 677.
259. [d. at 676-77 & n.6 (dictum).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 89-104.
261. 486 F.2d at 677 (dictum).
262. [d. at 676-77 (dictum)(emphasis added).
263. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
264. Consisting of Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist.
265. See id. at 490.
266. [d. (emphasis in the original); accord, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
737 n.9 (1980)(quoting Hampton with approval). Cf United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460,
1476 (D.C. Cir.)(Ginsburg, J., separate opinion)(1ower federal courts "lack authority,
where no specific constitutional right of the defendant has been violated, to dismiss indict
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the Hampton plurality, this could not be, for the defendant, the gov
ernment agents, and their informant had all "acted in concert with one
another."267 Thus, an accused would not be able to invoke the protec
tion of due process from police conduct clearly offensive to notions of
fair play and decency and standards of fundamental fairness, if that
conduct did not also directly infringe upon a protected right of the
defendant. 268
It is submitted that such a restrictive concept of the due process
defense would deprive it of much of its vitality, and would result in the
unseemly spectacle of government enforcing its criminal laws by meth
ods that are offensive to "the charter of its own existence."269 Fur
thermore, it would effectively deny protection to the predisposed
defendant, a result clearly intended by the Hampton plurality, for it is
difficult to conceive of police conduct that would directly infringe
upon a separate protected right of one predisposed to the commission
of the very offense of which he is charged. Since predisposition would
also strip him of the entrapment defense,27o the predisposed defendant
would be without a remedy for unconstitutional practices employed
against him in the enforcement of the criminal law.
More fundamentally, however, to perceive the concept of due
process as a protection that is triggered only by government activity
that violates some separate right of the defendant is to ignore reality.
In Rochin v. Caiijornia,271 the leading federal case on the issue of gov
ernmental misconduct in the enforcement of the criminal law, Justice
Frankfurter did not rest his decision reversing the defendant's convic
tion simply on any violation of a separate protected right to privacy or
the right to be free from bodily assaults and batteries. To the con
trary, he cried out against the very methods employed by the police to
obtain evidence of the defendant's guilt - forcibly extracting, first
manually and then by means of a stomach pump, two capsules of mor
phine from his body.272 The rationale of the Court's decision was
forcefully articulated by Justice Frankfurter:
ments as an exercise of supervisory power over the conduct of federal law enforcement
agents" (emphasis in the original», cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
267. 425 U.S. at 490.
268. See Comment, supra note 31, at 666. The majority of the Hampton Court did
not comment on the scope of the due process defense, and, therefore, did not intimate a
position on this issue.
269. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
271. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
272. Id. at 166.
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Applying these general considerations [of the governing principles
of due process] to the circumstances of the present case, we are
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this convic
tion was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by agents of gov
ernment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensi
bility. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation. 273

Although the methods employed in Rochin did violate the pri
vacy of the defendant's person, it is clear that Justice Frankfurter
rested the Court's decision primarily on the means used and not sim
ply on the issue of privacy. Thus, while the defendant's privacy con
cerns were implicated by the practices to which the government
resorted, it was the conduct itself that "shock[ed] the conscience" of .
the Court and smacked of "methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."274 The violation of
privacy may have been effected, but it was the "brutal conduct" em
ployed which offended notions offair play and decency.275 For Justice
Frankfurter, to sanction such methods "would be to afford brutality
the cloak of the law."276 He concluded, therefore, that ''force so brutal
and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect"
offended due process. 277
It is clear that Justice Frankfurter measured the police conduct in
Rochin against due process standards of fundamental fairness. He did
not base the Court's decision exclusively on principles of privacy.
Moreover, if it had been the intent of the Rochin Court to have pro
tected only privacy interests, it could easily have done so. The opinion
of the Court, however, is primarily devoid of such concerns.
Although the protection afforded would secure privacy interests,
Rochin sought also to place a constitutional limitation upon law en
forcement conduct by measuring police practices against due process
standards of fundamental fairness. Thus, the individual's privacy con
cerns would be addressed through the implementing restrictions im
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

[d. at 172 (emphasis added).
[d.
[d. at 173.
[d.
[d. at 174 (emphasis added).
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posed by due process on governmental activities, while,
simultaneously, the police would be held accountable for their behav
ior. The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that Rochin endorsed a
due process right of the individual to be free from outrageous govern
mental conduct in the enforcement of the criminal law.
This result makes good sense. To equate the due process defense
with law enforcement conduct that directly infringes upon or violates
some separate right of a defendant, as the Hampton plurality sug
gested and as the government urged in Archer, would effectively sepa
rate the defendant, for all practical purposes, from the protection of
the defense except in Rochin-type situations. Further, it would de
grade, by its limiting rationale, the very concept of due process as "a
profound attitude of fairness. . . between the individual and govern
ment. . . . "278 Ultimately, however, the most glaring flaw in the
Hampton plurality's suggestion stems from its fundamental miscon
ception of due process. Due process does not exist simply to vindicate
other rights. It is a right intrinsic to itself. It secures for all persons
the "most comprehensive protection of liberties. . . ."279 For exam
ple, the more limiting rights to counsel and against compulsory self
incrimination, secured respectively by the sixth 280 and fifth 281 amend
ments to the United States Constitution, are but specific guarantees of
this broad protection. 282 Therefore, it is submitted that the protection
of due process, with its comprehensive guarantee of fairness in the re
lations between government and citizen, is not dependent upon any
violation, by police misconduct, of a separate right of the defendant.
It is further submitted that there exists for each individual a specific
due process guarantee to be free from government-induced criminal
ity, and that it is beyond the pale oflegitimate conduct for government
to prey upon its citizens in the hope of inducing them to crime. 283
This guarantee, while securing and implementing for the individual
the more general right of privacy "to be let alone [by government],"284
278. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
279. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170.
280. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
281. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ."
282. See. e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)(right to counsel in
state prosecutions is fundamental and essential to a fair trial under fourteenth amendment
principles of due process); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73 (dictum)(coerced confessions in state
criminal proceedings offend principles of fairness under due process).
283. See Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum).
284. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis. J., dissenting).
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will act independently to place law enforcement officials under consti
tutionally prescribed standards of decency and moral behavior. Simi
larly, the courts of this nation possess the inherent power, as a matter
of public policy and in furtherance ofjudicial integrity and their super
visory powers,285 to close their doors to such foul and dirty
business. 286

285. Courts possess inherent supervisory powers over their proceedings "to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process," United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir.
1983), and to ensure that neither justice is denied nor injustice is rewarded. In the federal
system, the powers "first appeared as an independent basis of decision in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 [1943] . . . ." Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541. These powers are invoked to
formulate and apply proper and civilized standards for the enforcement of the criminal law
in judicial proceedings. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result); McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41. Thus, the courts, in crafting remedies pursuant to
their supervisory powers, will be "guided by considerations ofjustice . . . ." McNabb,318
U.S. at 341; accord, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
The powers may be employed to implement remedies, not specficially required by
either constitutional mandate or legislative command, for violations or denials of recog
nized rights, to preserve judicial integrity, and to deter illegal conduct or improper prac
tices. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505; Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541; see also United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980) ("we agree that the supervisory power serves the
'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity"), and id. at 734-37
& nn. 7-9. Cf United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir.)(Ginsburg, J., sepa
rate opinion)(1ower federal courts "lack authority, where no specific constitutional right of
the defendant has been violated, to dismiss indictments as an exercise of supervisory power
oVer the conduct of federal law enforcement agents" (emphasis in the original», cert. de
nied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the aid of a court's supervisory powers has been endorsed,
explicitly or implicitly, as a remedy for barring convictions, even of predisposed defendants,
because of outrageous law enforcement practices. In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court
justices in Hampton suggested their willingness to invoke the supervisory powers in cases of
police misconduct in the enforcement ot the criminal law that is sufficiently offensive to
violate principles of due process, irrespective of the predisposition of the defendants.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493-97 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (inter
preting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), as not foreclosing such aid) (explicit);
id. at 497 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting)(explicit); Sherman, 356 U.S. at
380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (entrapment cases) (explicit); see Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(entrapment cases) (implicit); Casey,
276 U.S. at 423-24, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (entrapment cases) (implicit); see also
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). However, supervisory
relief will not be forthcoming because of governmental misconduct, unless there exists "a
clear basis in fact and law for doing so. . . ." Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 541 (where actions of
law enforcement officers do not exceed "the bounds of permissible investigatory conduct,"
aid will be denied, and a court "need inquire no further").
286. Cf Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)
(endorsing concept in entrapment cases); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J.,
separate opinion); Casey, 276 U.S. at 423-24, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Donnelly,
supra note 24, at 1112.
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The Supreme Court and the Predisposed Defendant

In Hampton v. United States,287 a prosecution for the sale of her

oin to government undercover agents, the Supreme Court was afforded
an opportunity to address the issue of the applicability of the due pro
cess defense to a criminally predisposed defendant. Although the
court in United States v. Rusself288 had suggested, in dictum, the exist
ence of such a defense,289 and the necessary corollary that predispos
tion would not exclude a defendant from due process relief, a plurality
of justices in Hampton backed off from this position.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist argued that the only
remedy available to a defendant who has encouraged the acts of gov
ernment agents "lies solely in the defense of entrapment. "290 How
ever, as Justice Rehnquist observed, predisposition is fatal to this
defense. 291
Justice Rehnquist then proceeded to reaffirm 292 the comment
made by the court in Russell that the defense of entrapment "was not
intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
enforcement practices of which it did not approve. "293 In addition, he
quoted, with approval,294 the further observation made in Russell that
"[t]he execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided
primarily to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch of the [g]overnment, subject to
applicable constitutional and statutory limitations and to judicially
fashioned rules to enforce those limitations."295 But, to the Hampton
plurality, as Justice Rehnquist explained, the "limitations" of due pro
cess are triggered only by governmental misconduct which "violates
some protected right of the defendant."296 In Hampton, however, the
defendant, the government agents, and their informant had all acted in
concert with one another.297 Moreover, the defense of entrapment was
available to the defendant only if he could establish that he had been
287. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
288. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
289. Id. at 431-32 (dictum).
290. 425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 411 U.S. at 435.
294. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion).
295. 411 U.S. at 435.
296. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in the original); accord, United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (l980)(quoting Hampton with approval).
297. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion). In both Hampton, id. at 485-87 & n.3, 489
90, and Russell, 411 U.S. at 425-27, 433, 436, the facts revealed, and the defendants con
ceded, predisposition.
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induced by government agents to engage in criminal activity.298
Finally, Justice Rehnquist touched upon illegal activity of police
officers that exceeded "the scope of their duties" and was performed
"in concert with a defendant. . . ."299 Here, according to the plural
ity, the appropriate remedy lay, not in granting freedom to the equally
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the offending officers.300 There
fore, it would seem that the Hampton plurality implicitly rejected the
due process defense in the case of a predisposed defendant, no matter
how outrageous the governmental misconduct. 301 In sum, it would
appear that the Hampton plurality viewed predispostion as being as
fatal to the due process defense as it is to the entrapment defense. 302
This rigid position was too much for Justice Powell, who, joined
by Justice Blackmun in an opinion concurring in the judgement, took
exception to the plurality's attempt to deny due process relief to a
predisposed defendant, "regardless of the outrageousness of police be
havior in light of the surrounding circumstances. "303 He could find no
support for such a result either in Russell or in the earlier cases which
had delineated the defense of entrapment and its primary focus upon
the defendant's predisposition. 304 Further, Justice Powell noted that
the Supreme Court had "yet to confront [g]overnment overinvolve
ment in areas outside the realm of contraband offenses."305 "In these
circumstances," therefore, he was not prepared to conclude "that an
analysis other than one limited to predisposition would never be ap
propriate under due process principles."306
Justice Powell took further exception to the plurality's "use of the
'chancellor's foot' passage from Russell" as a potential means of fore
closing reliance on the Court's supervisory power "to bar conviction of
a predisposed defendant because of outrageous police conduct."307
Again, he did not understand Russell "to have gone so far," for that
case had indicated only that the Court "should be extremely reluctant
to invoke the supervisory power in cases of this kind because that
298. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion); Russell, 411 U.S. at 435; Sorrells, 287 U.S.
at 442, 452.
299. 425 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment).
302. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606-07 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377-79 (3d Cir. 1978).
303. 425 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
304. Id. at 492-93 & n.2.
305. Id. at 493.
306. Id. (footnote omitted).
307. Id.
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power does not give the 'federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto
over law enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve.' "308
Justice Powell was "not unmindful of the doctrinal and practical
difficulties of delineating limits to police involvement in crime that do
not focus on predisposition, as [g]overnment participation ordinarily
will be fully justified in society's 'war with the criminal classes.' "309
He recognized that this "undoubtedly" was the concern that
prompted the plurality in Hampton "to embrace an absolute rule."310
Justice Powell believed, however, that Russell had "left these questions
open,"3!! and since this case was "controlled completely by Rus
sell,"3!2 he was unwilling to conclude that, "no matter what the cir
cumstances," neither due process nor the Court's supervisory powers
"could support a bar to conviction in any case where the [g]overnment
is able to prove predisposition."3!3
Justice Powell was concerned that the "discussion of predisposi
tion" might "overlook the fact that there may be widely varying de
grees of criminal involvement."3!4 More fundamentally, howerer, he
believed that "[a] fair system of justice normally should eschew un
bending rules that foreclose, in their application, all judicial
discretion. "3!5
Although Justice Powell recognized that it would be difficult to
define proper limitations upon police involvement in criminal activi
ties, he did not believe that "these difficulties. . . justify the plurality'S
absolute rule."3!6 The essence of due process is "fundamental fair
ness,"3!7 and the Supreme Court's cases were "replete with examples
of judgments as to when such fairness has been denied an accused in
light of all the circumstances."3!8 Moreover, the fact that there is at
times "no sharply defined standard against which to make these judg
ments"3!9 was not "a sufficient reason," for Justice Powell, "to deny
the federal judiciary's power to make them when warranted by the
308. Id. at 493-94 (brackets in original).
309. Id. at 494-95 (footnotes omitted)(quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J.,
separate opinion».
310. 425 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. (footnote omitted).
314. Id. at 494 n.5 (emphasis added).
315. Id. (emphasis added).
316. Id.at494n.6.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 494-95 n.6.
319. Id. at 495 n.6.
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circumstances."32o And, "[m]uch the same" was "true of analysis"
under the Court's supervisory power. 321 Nor did Justice Powell
"despair" of the Court's ability "in an appropriate case" to identify
correct standards for law enforcement practices "without relying on
the 'chancellor's' 'fastidious squeamishness or private senti
mentalism.' "322
In conclusion, Justice Powell "emphasize[d] that the cases, if any,
in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare."323 He
acknowledged that "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime would have to
reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar con
viction."324 Justice Powell believed that this would prove to be "espe
cially difficult to show with respect to contraband offenses," which are
particularly difficult to detect in the absence of undercover govern
ment operations. 325 Moreover, one could not "easily exaggerate the
problems confronted by law enforcement authorities in dealing effec
tively with an expanding narcotics traffic,"326 which represented "one
of the major contributing causes of escalating crime in our cities."327
Justice Powell felt, therefore, that law enforcement officials "must be
allowed flexibility adequate to counter effectively such criminal
activity."328
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented in Hampton,
and, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, espoused the objective test for
entrapment. 329 In addition, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Pow
ell that Russell did not foreclose imposition of either a due process or a
supervisory powers bar to conviction where police misconduct "is suf
ficiently offensive,"33o even though a particular defendant "entitled to
invoke such a defense might be [criminally] 'predisposed.' "331 Justice
Brennan concluded that conviction should be barred "as a matter of
law where the subject of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband
provided to the defendant by a [g]overnment agent."332
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
supra text
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment).
Id.
/d.
;
Id. at 495-96 n.7.
Id. at 496 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For analysis of the objective test, see
accompanying notes 33-43, 105-34.
425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 500 (footnote omitted).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

42

[Vol. 7: I

Justice Stevens did not participate in the Hampton decision. This
produced, therefore, a Court division consisting of a plurality of three
justices, who appeared to have rejected a due process defense for the
predisposed defendant, irrespective of the degree and kind of govern
mental misconduct, and a majority of five justices who would seem
ingly permit a predisposed defendant to invoke the aid of both due
process and the supervisory powers if the government agents were
gUilty of "overinvolvement in crime [that had] . . . reach[ed] a demon
strable level of outrageousness. . . ."333 Since Hampton was decided,
however, Justice Stewart, one of the dissenters who endorsed due pro
cess and supervisory relief for predisposed defendants, has been re
placed by Justice O'Connor. Neither Justice O'Connor's views nor
those of Justice Stevens are known concerning the availability of due
process and supervisory relief for predisposed defendants who have
been victimized by governmental misconduct. Therefore, it is uncer
tain, at present, as to how the Supreme Court would rule if confronted
with this issue, nor would it be profitable to speculate about or predict
the outcome if such a case were to come before the Court. However,
since Justice Stevens, based upon his record, appears to be more of a
swing voter than Justice O'Connor, his vote might thus prove to be
crucial to the outcome. Of course, additional changes in the member
ship of the Court could further complicate the picture and make the
outcome even more unpredictable.
4.

Applying the Defense

Although the issue of whether specific governmental conduct is
violative of due process is one of law,334 the outcome of such an in
quiry will hinge upon an assessment of "the totality of the circum
stances[,] with no single factor controlling."335 This inquiry, because
333. Id. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see United States v.
Williams, 705 F.2d 623, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983); United States v.
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United
States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d
373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 354, 462
N.E.2d 80, 85 (1984); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People
v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519-20, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,718 (1978); see
also United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Margolis v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 704
F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3542 (1983); United States v. Brown, 635
F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.
1980), cert denied sub nom. Perluss v. United States, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
334. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
335. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Hohensee,
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of the flexible nature of due process,336 will not lead to a "precise line
of demarcation or calibrated measuring rod with a mathematical solu
tion."337 This is not surprising, for what is being sought is nothing less
than police misconduct which has attained the "demonstrable level of
outrageousness"338 condemned by the "fundamental and necessarily
general but pliant postulates"339 of due process. As the Second Circuit
has observed, "[t]he cases that have sustained due process claims con
cern [g]overnment conduct that was most egregious and reached the
level of shocking the conscience. "340 In sum, therefore, a defendant
who has been victimized by police misconduct "repugnant to the
American system of criminal justice,"341 and involving government
participation in, or control of, criminal activity to an unconscionable
degree,342 may invoke the due process defense of outrageous police
conduct.
Certain aspects of the conduct required to satisfy the due process
criteria have been deemed by the courts to be indicative of law en
forcement misconduct which violates fundamental fairness. Among
the factors that may be considered as relevant to a denial of due pro
cess are (1) the manufacture, creation, and control of crime by govern
ment agents that substantially and unreasonably exceed the level of
650 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492, 494-95 nn.5-6
(Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378
N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (1978).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84.
337. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
719 (1978).
338. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); accord.
United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, \3 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); United States v.
Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir.), cerr. denied, \03 S. Ct. 3542 (1983); United
States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
339. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,
719 (1978).
340. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 835
(1982); see United States V. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
524 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1 \06 (1982)("only the most intolerable government conduct" will qualify for the
due process defense).
341. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886,891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Margolis V. United States, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984); see Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (law enforce
ment conduct violatve of "that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice,' mandated by . . . [d]ue [p]rocess")(quoting Kinsella v. United States ex. rei. Sin
gleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960»; United States v. Ramirez, 7\0 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.
1983)(conduct so outrageous as to shock a sense of justice).
342. See United States V. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 375-76, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1978); Greene
V. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 784-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268,
268-70,274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People V. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 515-18, 522-23, 378
N.W.2d 78, 79-81, 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715-17, 720 (1978).
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activity necessary to detect and apprehend criminals, or to gain their
confidence;343 (2) the strength and degree of the causal relationship
between the governmental misconduct and the criminal activities of
the defendant;344 (3) persistent and repeated efforts by law enforce
ment officers to wear down and eventually overcome the defendant's
reluctance to participate in the proposed criminal activity;345 and (4) a
predominant motive by the police to induce criminality solely to se
cure a conviction. 346 Similarly, the type of crime under investigation
is relevant to the scope of permissible law enforcement conduct. 347
Here, the standard of reasonable involvement by government should
be measured against the complexity and need for secrecy in preparing
and executing the particular offense in question. This is because the
intricacy of the enterprise and the difficulty in penetrating to its core
will require a more intense police presence. Thus, the more complex
and clandestine the criminal operation is, the greater will be the justifi
cation for the extent of government participation, provided that such
activity does not attain the level of pervasive control and direction.
Conversely, the less intricate and secretive the offense, the more re
strictive will be the tolerable scope of law enforcement involvement.
Ultimately, a court must assess the totality of the circumstances 348 to
determine whether the government has exceeded the bounds of de
cency and has engaged in conduct that shocks the conscience and of
fends a sense of justice.349
Although instances of due process misconduct involving a predis
343. See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)(Iisted as an
example of the defense by the court); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir.
1978); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971); State v. Hohensee,
650 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378
N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978); see also United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d
1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980)(implicit1y recognizing such overinvolvement as an example of
the defense).
344. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980).
345. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 84, 406
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, 720 (1978).
346. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Isaac
son, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78,84,406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978); see also Greene
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971). The government may rebut a claim
of improper motive by evidence demonstrating that its investigation of the defendant was
reasonable and free of improper motive, even though such evidence might amount to inad
missible hearsay if it were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. See United
States v. Hunt, 36 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2203, 2203 (4th Cir. Nov. 28, 1984).
347. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980).
348. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971).
349. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-74; People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378
N.E.2d 78, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978).
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posed defendant "will be rare,"350 such cases do exist. Moreover, as a
review of these cases will demonstrate, merely "prosecuting the police
under the applicable provisions of state or federal law" for "engag[ing]
in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their
duties,"351 as Justice Rehnquist has urged, is simply not an adequate
remedy; for what is at stake is not only the vindication of constitu
tional guarantees but also the very preservation of judicial integrity
itself. To state the proposition in its starkest terms, the courts must
close their doors to "such prostitution of the criminallaw"352 as an act
of self-preservation. What is called for is a judicial pledge of allegiance
to "the purity of [the court's] own temple"353 and to the preservation
of the Constitution. 354 "[P]rosecuting the police" will not fulfill these
goals, and will be irrelevant to the preservation of judicial integrity.
In Greene v. United States,355 a prosecution for the illegal manu
facture of alcohol, the facts revealed that an undercover agent reestab
lished contact with the defendants after having been instrumental in
causing their previous arrest on bootlegging charges. 356 The agent
then pressured the defendants to establish a new liquor operation, and
for over two years was deeply involved in the defendants' illicit activi
ties. 357 These included offering to supply materials, an operator, and a
location for the still, as well as actually supplying two thousand
pounds of sugar at wholesale prices. 358 Throughout this extended pe
riod of operations, the government, through its undercover agent, was
the sole purchaser of all the liquor that the defendants produced at the
still.359
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal from the defendants' convictions,
rejected the defense of entrapment, in that the defendants had been
predisposed to sell bootleg whiskey from the time that the agent had
first contacted them. 360 However, it reversed and ordered dismissal of
charges, because the government had so enmeshed itself in criminal
activity, "from beginning to end," that a conviction under these cir
350. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment).
351. [d. at 490 (plurality opinion).
352. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
353. /d.
354. Cj. United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 13 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(due
process misconduct "compel[s] acquittal so as to protect the Constitution").
355. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
356. [d. at 784.
357. [d. at 785.
358. [d. at 785-86.
359. [d. at 786.
360. [d.
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cumstances was "repugnant to American criminal justice.
"361
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit, in Greene, did not explicitly
invoke the principles of due process as the ground for reversal, the
concept of fundamental fairness under due process was clearly the ba
sis of the court's decision.
Similarly, in United States v. Twigg,362 the Third Circuit found
government involvement in the illegal manufacture of drugs so perva
sive and outrageous as to offend due process. 363 Here, government
agents, acting through an informant who was himself a convicted felon
desirous of reducing the severity of his sentence, suggested to the de
fendants the establishment of a drug factory, provided all necessary
equipment and expertise, as well as the location for the factory, and
performed the lion's share of the manufacturing. 364 By contrast, the
defendants' involvement in the illicit operation was minimal, and then
only at the specific direction of the informant. 365
Although entrapment was not available to the defendants because
of their predisposition,366 the court found the due process argument of
the defendant, Nevill, "persuasive,"367 for the government had en
gaged in the "egregious conduct" of "generat[ing] new crimes by the
defendant [Neville] merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges
against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and
peacefully minding his own affairs. "368 As the court viewed the situa
tion, "[fJundamental fairness [WOUld] not permit [it] to countenance
such actions by law enforcement officials. . . ."369 Accordingly,
"prosecution for a crime so fomented by [government agents would]
be barred."370
In State v. Hohensee,371 the defendant was convicted of a burglary
which was "sponsored," manufactured, and directed by the Spring
361. Id. at 787.
362. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
363. Id. at 380-81.
364. Id. at 375-76, 380-81.
365. Id. at 376, 381.
366. Id. at 376.
367. /d. at 377.
368. Id. at 381.
369. Id.
370. Id. (footnote omitted). The continued vitality of Twigg has been questioned.
See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d II, 12 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam); United States v.
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610 n.17 (3d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)("In
this day of heightened criminal activity, the federal judiciary must be cautious not to exer
cise a 'veto' - especially . . . a constitutional veto - 'over law enforcement practices of
which it [does) not approve.''' (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 435)(brackets in the original».
371. 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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field, Missouri, Police Department.3 72 To perpetrate the burglary, the
police made a " 'deal' " with two convicted felons, who, in return for
leniency on another burglary charge, agreed to supply information to
the police concerning burglaries in Springfield. 373 For this, the infor
mants were being paid weekly salaries by the police, who kept them
under close supervision. 374
One of the informants had been acquainted with the defendant
for approximately seven years, during which burglary had been "their
principal topic of conversation."375 Contact was made with the de
fendant, and the two informants, Officer Roberts of the Springfield Po
lice Department, who was acting in an undercover capacity, and the
defendant met at a house that had been rented pursuant to an under
cover operation known as " 'Operation Rosebud.' "376 The purpose of
this conference was to discuss the burglary of "the Brandhorst
building. "377
Since the defendant was familiar with the interior of the building,
he was able to draw a floor plan which included the location of a par
ticular safe that was the object of the break-in.378 Using separate vehi
cles, the four individuals proceeded to the "target area. . . ."379 The
defendant drove his own vehicle, while the two informants and Officer
Roberts traveled in a separate" 'Ford van.' "380 The defendant drove
into a parking lot, "approximately 150 yards from the Brandhorst
building," and remained there as a 100kout. 381 Meanwhile, the two
informants broke into the building and removed the safe. 382 Officer
Roberts, who had remained outside, helped the informants load the
safe into the van. 383 The three of them "then drove past the lookout
position of the defendant, who followed them to the undercover
house."384
On appeal, the defendant claimed that his conviction of burglary
372. See id. at 268-70.
373. [d. at 269.
374. [d.
375. [d.
376. [d. at 269, 270.
377. [d. at 269. The subsequent break-in of this building, which formed the basis of
the prosecution of the defendant, was accomplished without the prior consent or knowl
edge of the owner. [d. at 268-69.
378. [d. at 269.
379. [d.
380. [d.
381. [d.
382. [d.
383. [d.
384. [d.
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should be invalidated on due process grounds, because he had been
victimized by the misconduct of the police and their agents. 385 After
thoroughly reviewing the relevant case authorities,386 the Missouri
Court of Appeals, in Hohensee, concluded that the overreaching in
volvement of the law enforcement officials in the burglary of the
Brandhorst building was sufficiently outrageous to offend principles of
due process. 387 The court therefore reversed the defendants'
conviction. 388
Characterizing the defendant's involvement, primarily as a look
out, in the criminal enterprise as "no more of a threat to society than
that of a stargazer, similarly situated, contemplating Polaris,"389 the
court found it "difficult to conceive a situation where the government's
involvement could be greater or the defendant's could be less, and the
conduct of the latter still be a likely subject for prosecution."39o Thus,
the court reasoned that the break-in was accomplished by the govern
ment agents without benefit of the defendant's presence, and his con
duct, standing alone, would not have been illegal if the agents had not
engaged in their illegal acts.391 In addition, the court noted that there
was no evidence that the burglary "was part of ongoing criminal activ
ities engaged in by defendant prior to his involvement with Officer
Roberts and the two salaried felons."392
In a strong concurring opinion, Chief Judge Greene observed that
what the government had concocted here was nothing less than a man
ufactured crime, "aided and abetted by two habitual criminals" hired
by the police for such purpose, "in hopes of getting evidence to show
that the defendant, by acting as a supposed lookout, was also guilty of
385. Id. The defendant, because of his predisposition, made no claim of entrapment.
Id. at 270 & n.2.
386. Id. at 270-74.
387. Id. at 274.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. The defendant had also been convicted of conspiring to burglarize a speci
fied residence. Here, however, the court upheld the conviction and rejected the defendant's
argument that there could be no conspiracy where the alleged co-conspirators were either
law enforcement officers or their agents who lacked the requisite criminal intent. Under
the applicable statute, the prosecution was required to prove only that the defendant, with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating that burglary, did agree with Officer Roberts and
the two paid informants that they, or one or more of them, would burglarize the residence.
Id. at 276. This was the gist of the defendant's agreement, and, to the court, the fact that
the other three co-conspirators lacked the criminal intent to commit the burglary was "of
no moment." Id.
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the crime."393 For Chief Judge Greene, if such conduct received the
sanction of the courts, it was "difficult to imagine under what circum
stances they would ever say to the police, 'You have gone too far.' "394
Moreover, Chief Judge Greene condemned the police misconduct
in Hohensee for breeding disrespect for law enforcement officers, erod
ing public confidence in the criminal justice system, and, "if con
doned," resulting in ''police excesses that cannot be tolerated in a
democracy. "395 Although he acknowledged that most law enforce
ment excesses were undoubtedly "motivated by frustration over the
inability of the police to completely satisfy the demands of the public
to 'get the criminals off the streets,' "396 Chief Judge Greene neverthe
less concluded that this inability could not "justify breaking the law by
those who are sworn to uphold it."397
Finally, in People v. /saacson,398 the New York Court of Appeals
condemned police misconduct that originated with the arrest of a
third person for possession of a controlled substance and who was sub
sequently physically abused during interrogation by police officers. 399
Later, when the officers learned that the substance was not a con
trolled one, they kept this information from him until after his services
as an informant had ended.400 Instead, he was kept under the delusion
that he was facing a substantial period of incarceration if convicted.
He thus agreed, upon advice of counsel, to be an informant for the
police. 401
The informant proceeded to contact various individuals, includ
ing the defendant, in order to set up drug deals for which the police
could arrest the sellers. 402 The defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania
with no prior record, initially refused the informant's pleas to help him
"make money to hire a decent lawyer" in order to fight the criminal
charges facing him.403 After persistent entreaties by the informant,
however, the defendant finally agreed to sell cocaine to the informant
in a quantity suggested by the police so they could obtain a conviction
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

[d. (Green, c.J., concurring).
[d.
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
[d.
44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
[d. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
[d.
[d. at SIS, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
[d. at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
[d.
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under New York law for a higher grade of crime.404 The police also
used the informant to lure the defendant into New York for the sale,
although the defendant feared New York's drug laws and did not want
the sale to take place there. 405 Finally, the informant suceeded in get
ting the defendant to cross the state line into New York and to con
summate the deal, even though the defendant thought that the place
selected for the sale was in Pennsylvania. 406 At the meeting place, the
defendant was arrested in the course of the transaction. 407
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convic
tion and ordered the dismissal of the indictment for conduct so egre
gious as to violate due process standards of fairness. 408 The court was
compelled to this result by the cumulative effect of "the manufacture
and creation of crime,"409 the "deceptive, dishonest[,] and improper"
practices employed by the police to intimidate and trick the informant,
and thereby the defendant indirectly, into the commission of a crimi
nal offense,410 the persistent effort to overcome the defendant's reluc
tance to commit the offense,411 and "the overriding police desire for a
conviction of any individual."412 What struck the court as particu
larly offensive was the "incredible geographical shell game - a deceit
which effected defendant's unknowing and unintended passage across
the border into this State."413 In short, the police were not motivated
by "any desire to prevent crime by cutting off the source" of illicit
drugs,414 and sought only a conviction that would become "little more
than a statistic."415
Thus, the case revealed in its totality "the ugliness of police bru
tality,"416 compounded by deceit and persistent inducement, "to sat
isfy the police thirst for a conviction" in brazen disregard of
fundamental fairness and rights. 417 In conclusion, the court brushed
aside the defendant's predisposition because the proper focus of in
quiry was on whether the concept of fundamental fairness mandated
404.
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407.
408.

409.
410.

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

516-17, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
517, 378 N.E.2d at 80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17.
517-18,378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
518, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
518-20, 378 N.E.2d at 81-82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717-18.
522, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
522, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.

at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
at 523, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
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dismissal 418 The court declared that the proper administration of jus
tice required, as a matter of due process,419 that "this prosecution
should be barred. "420
The Isaacson court emphasized, however, that it was not limiting
its due process analysis to situations involving police brutality. While
this type of conduct would justify the barring of prosecution, it did not
define the limits of the inquiry or the scope of due process relief. 421
The court implicitly recognized that due process was too flexible a
concept to fit neatly into a factual frame defined by "precise line[s] of
demarcation or calibrated measuring rod[s] . . . ."422 Therefore, in
order "[t]o prevent improper and unwarranted police solicitation of
crime,"423 courts must apply the "fundamental and necessarily general
but pliant postulates" of due process analysis to the peculiar factual
circumstances of each instance "in which a deprivation is as
serted. . . ."424 Implicit in this position is the recognition that such
an approach is most adaptable to providing the broad protection
against outrageous police practices that only due process standards of
fundamental fairness can guarantee.
The common thread running through these cases is the pervasive,
overreaching involvement of government and its agents in the manu
facture, direction, and control of crime for purposes of prosecution.
Government has a duty to prevent crime, not create crime, to appre
hend criminals, not become a crimina1. 425 One has no quarrel with the
proposition that government may employ "deceit,"426 "[a]rtifice[,] and
stratagem,"427 set "traps,"428 and use "decoys[] and deception"429 to
ensnare criminals. Criminal activity, by its very nature, will fre
quently take place in secret and prove difficult to detect. To effectively
418. [d. at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
419. See id. at 525, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
420. [d. at 525, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
421. See id. at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 83,406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
422. [d. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
423. [d. at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 83,406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
424. [d. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
425. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70 (Holmes, I., dissenting); see also id.
at 483-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Casey, 276 U.S. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum).
426. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
427. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441; accord. id. at 453-54 (Roberts, J. separate opinion); see
Commonwealth v. Shuman, 391 Mass. 345, 351,462 N.E.2d 80,83 (1984); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOrf, supra note 21, § 48, at 369.
428. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
429. [d. at 453-54.
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counter it, law enforcement agencies must resort to "stealth and strat
egy" as "necessary weapons in [their] arsenal. . . ."430 Thus, as we
have seen,431 it is proper for government agents, in particular those
engaged in undercover operations, to provide the opportunity, or fur
nish the facilities, for the commission of crime. But, while facilitating
the commission of criminal activity, or even partially assisting in its
execution, may be permissible, manufacturing crime is not. Peripheral
involvement in crime is one thing; creation, direction, and control are
another.
When government goes beyond the mere facilitation of crime,
when it exceeds the use of traps, decoys, deceit, and deception, when it
instigates or induces citizens, whether predisposed to the commission
of crime or not, when its involvement in crime becomes more than
peripheral, when its activity reaches the level of creation, direction,
and control, then "enough is more than enough - it is just too
much. "432 At this point, crime has become "the product of the crea
tive activity" of government,433 and not of the criminal classes. It is
then time for the courts to step in and bar their doors to the prosecu
tion of citizens for such manufactured and orchestrated "crimes."
And, it is here that the need for due process protection is compelling.
Both the SUbjective and objective tests for entrapment provide
only partial, and inadequate, relief. First, the statutory premise of the
SUbjective approach to entrapment deprives the doctrine of a constitu
tional footing and exposes it to modification by legislative fiat. 434 Sec
ond, under the SUbjective analysis, criminal predisposition is fatal to a
claim of entrapment. 435 Similarly, the objective test for entrapment,
while extending protection to the predisposed defendant,436 lacks a
constitutional basis.437 Thus, it is simply doctrinally and normatively
430. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
432. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th CiT. 1962)(Brown, J., con
curring specially); see Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest,
66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 620, 629-31 (1982).
433. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451; accord, Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
434. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40, 105-34.
437. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432-33; supra text accompanying notes 135-37; see also
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J.,separate opinion)(the defendant "has no rights or
equities by reason of his entrapment" (emphasis added»; Note, supra note 22, at 1456-57;
cf. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)(placing the
objective analysis on both a supervisory-power and judicial-integrity footing); Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 455, 457, 459 (Roberts, J., separate opinion)(same, except that implicitly as to su
pervisory-power basis).
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inadequate to establish national standards of decency and fairness
against which to measure the reasonableness of police practices in the
enforcement of the criminal laws. The ultimate drawback, however,
to invoking the protection of entrapment principles against outrageous
"[p]olice overinvolvement in crime,"438 arises from the limiting scope
of the doctrine which does not extend to conduct that shocks the con
science and offends notions of decency and fair play.439 Hence, the
need for a due process defense.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We return, then, to the central theme of this article. The issue of
police misconduct in the enforcement of the criminal law is not an
issue of law enforcement, it is an argument about government. As this
article has endeavored to show, the manufacture of crime is not the
legitimate business of government. 440 Neither is it the proper function
of government to prey upon its citizens by instigating or inducing
them to crime. 441 In our zeal to combat crime, we must not permit the
government to become the ultimate lawbreaker. In the words of Jus
tice Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib
erty when the [g]ovemment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 442

While the apprehension and prosecution of criminals are desira
ble ends,443 they do not justify "foul means . . . . "444 It is, therefore,
the inherent duty of courts to "preserve the purity"445 of their "own
temple[s]446 by refusing to have a hand in "such dirty business"447 that
is repugnant to due process standards of fundamental fairness. Thus,
it is both the legal and moral duty of government in a democratic
438. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the jUdgment).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
440. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion), and id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result).
441. See Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (dictum).
442. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted) (empha
sis added).
443. See id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
444. Casey, 276 U.S. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
445. [d. at 425.
446. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
447. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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society to enforce its criminal laws pursuant to a sense of fair play and
within the limits of civilized standards of decency.

